On the Pacific Salmon Treaty


讲座主题On the Pacific Salmon Treaty


时间:20181130日(周)上午930 1200



This paper studies the optimal design of the Pacific Salmon Treaty, whichwas signed by the U.S. and Canada in 1999 to share salmon on the Pacific coast. Moral hazard exists because countries may steal from each other. If acountry's observed output is suspiciously too high, the treaty either reducesthe country's future share, or asks the country to make a monetary transferto its opponent. On the theoretical front,the paper shows optimality differential equation, with appropriate boundary conditionshas exactly two solutions. This result could highly increase the computational efficiency of such game. On the applied front, the paper calibrates a highlytheoretical model to actual data and shows that it is optimal forthe U.S. to pay Canada $328.94 million every 30.78 years. Switching to theoptimal contract improves the total welfare by 1.55%.


江深哲,2017年美国德克萨斯农工大学获经济学博士学位,现为北京大学新结构经济学研究院助理教授,主要研究领域为宏观经济理论,动态契约理论。曾为Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,  Economics Letter, 《经济学季刊》等多本经济学杂志过评审。其工作论文 On the Pacific Salmon Treaty (《关于<太平洋三文鱼协定>》)现已在国际顶级期刊Economic Journal修改并重新提交 (Revised and Resubmitted)



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